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NOTES
CLASS ACTION COUNSEL AS NAMED PLAINTIFF:
DOUBLE TROUBLE
INTRODUCTION

When a court renders judgment in a class action suit,' all members of
the class are bound by the judgment,2 regardless of whether they were
named parties in the action. 3 Because members of the class who are not
named plaintiffs ("absent class members") 4 are bound by the judgment, 5

courts will not certify a class unless the proposed class satisfies the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23.6 Adequacy of
1. Class actions are lawsuits brought by a few individuals on behalf of a group of
people similarly situated. See 1 H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 1.01 (2d ed.
1985).
2. A class judgment, in most cases, is res judicata as to members of the class. See.
e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985); Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32, 42 (1940).
3. A named plaintiff, also referred to as a class representative, is a party who sues on
behalf of a group of individuals with common claims. The representative is a party to the
litigation and "stand[s] in judgment for those who are not." Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32, 43 (1940).
4. Rule 23(a), which lists the prerequisites to a class action, requires that "the class
[be] so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
Absent class members are class members who are not joined or made formal parties to
the suit. See I H. Newberg, supra note 1, § 1.07, at 11-12. While a party to a lawsuit
owes certain obligations, the absent class member "is not required to do anything." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985). He does not have to hire an
attorney or appear in court and is not subject to other burdens of litigation. See id. He is
not "subject to counterclaims or cross-claims, or liability for fees or costs." Id. An adverse judgment, however, does extinguish any claims of the absent class member that
were litigated. Id. To prevent his claim from being adjudicated by others, the absent
member is provided with an opportunity to opt out of the class. See id. at 810-11. It
should be noted that this opt-out opportunity only exists in class actions under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(3). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2); 7B C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 1786, at 188-91 (2d ed. 1986). For a general discussion
of the right to opt out, see id, at 188-209.
5. Class action represents an exception to the rule that an absent party cannot be
bound by judgment in personam. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808
(1985). As long as the named parties adequately represent the absent class members, the
judgment will bind the absent parties. See id.; see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 4142 (1940); Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 89-90 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting
National Ass'n of Regional Medical Programs v. Mathers, 551 F.2d 340 (D.C. Cir.
1976)), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980).
6. Rule 23(a) lists the following as prerequisites to a class action:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). To "maintain" the class action, however, a lawsuit must fall within
one of the subdivisions of Rule 23(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
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representation, one of the Rule 23 prerequisites for a class action, 7 protects the due process rights of absent class members.' To determine
whether representation is adequate, courts often focus on the quality of
counsel.9 As a result, if an attorney has interests that conflict with those
of class members, a court may find his representation of the class to be
inadequate. "o
When an attorney seeks to serve as both named plaintiff and class
counsel ("dual capacity"), courts face the question of whether he can
represent the class adequately. In addressing this question, courts focus
on the attorney's qualifications as class counsel rather than his role as
named plaintiff. 1 Some courts hold that the potential conflicts of interest that arise from the dual-capacity role always require the courts to
disqualify the attorney as class counsel.12 Other courts adopt a fact-specific approach and allow dual-capacity representation under certain

circumstances. 13
This Note examines the policies underlying class action suits and the
potential conflicts that arise when an attorney seeks to serve as counsel
7. See supra note 6. Adequate representation requires that class counsel be competent and qualified, and that no antagonism exist between the representatives and the class
members. See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982); Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975); Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th
Cir. 1978); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1968). The
would-be class representative bears the burden of proving his adequacy. See Susman v.
Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 90 (7th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980); see
also 7A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1765, at 273-74
(2d ed. 1986). But see In re Cohen's Will, 51 F.R.D. 167, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (defendant had burden of establishing inadequacy of representation); Fidelis Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 293 F. Supp. 164, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (same). The court may assume
counsel's competence unless defendant challenges it. See Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F.
Supp. 289, 294 (N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd, 403 U.S. 901 (1971). A court of appeals will
reverse a trial court's finding of adequate representation only where an abuse of discretion
is shown. See Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 90 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980); Morris v. McCaddin, 553 F.2d 866, 870 (4th Cir. 1977).
8. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985); Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940).
9. See Susman, 561 F.2d at 90; Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d
Cir. 1968); see also 7A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra note 7, § 1769.1, at 375 &
n.3.
10. See, e.g., Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1119, 1129 (11th Cir. 1985) (plaintiffs' counsel had conflicts of interest with class, including being involved in lawsuits
against a minority of class members, requiring disqualification), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1169 (1986); Board of Educ. of New York v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979)
(disqualification should be ordered "where an attorney's conflict of interests... undermines the court's confidence in the vigor of the attorney's representation of his client," id.
(footnote omitted)).
11. See Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1978); Kramer v.
Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1090 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
12. See, e.g., Zylstra, 578 F.2d at 104; Kramer, 534 F.2d at 1090-92; Turoff v. May
Co., 531 F.2d 1357, 1360 (6th Cir. 1976).
13. See, e.g., Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014, 1024 (5th Cir. Unit
A Feb. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d
86, 93-94 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980).
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for a class of which either he, a close family member, or a legal associate,
is a member. It analyzes these potential conflicts and suggests that disqualification never should be automatic. This Note concludes that defendants should not be allowed to use a per se rule of disqualification in

order to hamper class certification and, thereby, delay or avoid liability14 A case-by-case determination of whether an attorney serving in a
dual capacity can represent the class adequately better accords with the
policies underlying the availability of class actions under Rule 23 than
does a per se rule mandating disqualification.

I. ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION-THE DUAL-CAPACITY PROBLEM
A. The Class Action Device
The class action provides an efficient method for adjudicating certain

types of lawsuits.1 5 A major objective of the class action is to facilitate
individual plaintiffs' access to the courtroom in situations in which they
may be unable to bring separate actions.' 6 Class actions also increase
14. While the possibility of abuse of the class action device by a lawyer seeking to act
in a dual capacity exists, see infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text, courts must weigh
this possibility against the likelihood that a defendant's opposition to class certification is
for equally improper reasons. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. Adoption of a
per se rule of disqualification prevents the courts from considering the latter possibility
and thus gives defendants a powerful tool with which to postpone or escape liability.
Although permitting an attorney to serve in a dual capacity may not always be appropriate, the question should be consigned to the discretion of the trial court judge in accordance with the power granted to him under Rule 23. See infra note 24 and accompanying
text.
15. See Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 831 (3d Cir. 1973). The
original class action Rule 23 was promulgated in 1937. See Letter of Submittal, 308 U.S.
649 (1937). Historically, its purpose was to promote judicial efficiency. See Greenfield,
483 F.2d at 831. Ambiguity as to the meaning of the terms "true", "hybrid", and "spurious", which were used to categorize class actions, see 1966 Amendments to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23, advisory committee's note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98 (1966) [hereinafter Comm. Notes], and
the lack of guidance to ensure procedural fairness, caused the Supreme Court in 1966 to
amend Rule 23 to its present form. See Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 383
U.S. 1047 (1966).
16. See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402-03 (1980); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972); 1 H. Newberg, supra note I, § 1.05, at 7; Kaplan, 4 Prefatory
Note, 10 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 497, 497 (1969). Economic reasons would prevent
some plaintiffs from bringing individual claims. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797, 809 (1985); Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 831 (3d Cir.
1973); Note, Abuse in PlaintiffClass Action Settlements" The Need for a Guardian During
PretrialSettlement Negotiations, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 308, 311 (1985).

The Supreme Court has recognized that when litigation costs and attorneys fees exceed
the potential recovery by each individual, "most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic
day in court if a class action were not available." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797, 809 (1985). By enabling these otherwise impractical claims to be brought, Rule
23 deters conduct that causes minor injuries to many individuals.
Class action's deterrence of unlawful activity has saved millions of dollars in damages.
See In re Gypsum Cases, 386 F. Supp. 959, 967 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (over S86 million
saved), aff'd, 565 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1977); Arenson v. Board of Trade, 372 F. Supp.
1349, 1355 (N.D. Ill. 1974) ($800 million estimated savings). See generally 1 H. New-
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judicial efficiency17 by allowing trials involving similar claims to be consolidated into one case."' This consolidation of claims also prevents the
possibility of inconsistent adjudications of like claims. 19
berg, supra note 1, § 5.13, at 448. To further the goal of deterrence, courts allow cy pres
distributions. See 2 H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions §§ 10.15, 10.17, at 372-74
(2d ed. 1985). A cy pres distribution deals with the portion of a class recovery that is
unclaimed or cannot be distributed to individual class members. Id. Rather than returning this portion to the defendant, a cy pres distribution allocates the unclaimed or
undistributed funds in such a way as to achieve an indirect prospective benefit to the
class. Id. at 374. Market Street Railway Company v. Railroad Commission, 28 Cal. 2d
363, 171 P.2d 875, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 793 (1946), provides a perfect example of this.
The excess street railway fares collected by defendant were impossible to distribute to
class members. Id. at 371-72, 171 P.2d at 880-81. The court, using a cy pres distribution,
gave the recovery to the city to improve the railroads. Id. at 373, 171 P.2d at 881-82.
17. Cases allowed to be brought under Rule 23(b)(3) are "cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense." Comm. Notes, supra note 15,
at 102. Class actions are justified where "the public policy considerations of efficient
court administration outweigh the potential prejudice to [absent class members]."
Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 831 (3d Cir. 1973).
18. See Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 495 (N.D. I11.
1969); 1 H. Newberg, supra note 1, § 5.13, at 447; Kaplan, supra note 16, at 497. For a
class action to proceed, commonality and typicality of the class members' claims and
defenses must exist. See supra note 6. If plaintiffs sued individually, the cases would
duplicate one another. See Harper& Row Publishers,Inc., 301 F. Supp. at 495; Ford,
FederalRule 23: A Devicefor Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev.

501, 504 (1969); Kaplan, supra note 16, at 497. Class actions prevent this waste of judicial resources by allowing adjudication of all of the plaintiffs' claims in one proceeding.
See Note, supra note 16, at 311.
Rule 23(b)(3) permits class actions, however, only when a court finds that "a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Once the court finds superiority, and other requisites are satisfied, it adjudicates plaintiffs' actions together, preventing multiple lawsuits.
See Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 495 (N.D. I11.1969);
Adderly v. Wainwright, 46 F.R.D. 97, 99 (M.D. Fla. 1968).
19. One of the objectives of Rule 23 is to prevent inconsistent adjudications. See
Comm. Notes, supra note 15, at 100 cl. (A); see also United States Parole Comm'n v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402-03 (1980) ("[t]he justifications that led to the development
of the class action include the protection of the defendant from inconsistent obligations");
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. at 495 ("class actions .

. .

. reduce the

likelihood of inconsistent judgments"). If many plaintiffs sued the same defendant in
separate actions, the same defendant might be absolved of liability in some actions while
found liable in others. See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1318, 1366-67 (1976) [hereinafter Developments-ClassActions].

Inconsistent adjudications can result when multiple actions are initiated seeking either
injunctive relief or money damages. See, e.g., Goff v. Menke, 672 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir.
1982); Cass Clay, Inc. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 63 F.R.D. 34, 36 (S.D.S.D. 1974).
In Goff v. Menke, a case involving prisoners' rights, if the penitentiary were told in one
case that it could continue to restrict the prisoners' exercise, and in a separate case were
enjoined from such action, the penitentiary would face problems caused by the inconsistent adjudications. Goff, 672 F.2d at 704-05.
In actions for damages, a similar problem arises when many plaintiffs claim against a
single fund. See Cass Clay, Inc., 63 F.R.D. at 36-37 ("[I]ndividual suits could exhaust the
fund before all members of the class were able to protect their interests." Id. at 37 (quoting Comment, Rule 23: Categoriesof Subsection (b), 10 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 539,

541 (1969))). A defendant's liability in the individual suits could exceed the fund, leaving
the defendant unable to allocate the fund according to the courts' judgments. A class
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Despite the benefits derived from the use of class actions, the device is
subject to abuse.2z Possible abuses include strike suits2" and suits
brought by attorneys for the sole purpose of receiving fees.' Courts
must act to prevent such abuses to protect defendants from harassment

and coercion.

3

They also must be concerned with protecting the rights

of absent class members,2 4 and the interests of defendants in the proper

action prevents this problem by allowing "final determination of all the claims" with
"separate proof of the amount of each claim and its pro rata share of the fund." Id. See
generally Developments--Class Actions, supra, 1366-68 (discussing advantages of class
actions when case-by-case adjudication might lead to inconsistent results). But see In re
Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 852 (9th
Cir. 1982) (certification proper only when separate claims will affect later claims), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762,
789-90 (E.D.N.Y.) (certification denied where no proof was offered to show defendant
would become insolvent), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 987 (1980), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1067 (1984).
20. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980); Kramer v.
Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1090-91 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830
(1976); Turoff v. May Co., 531 F.2d 1357, 1360 (6th Cir. 1976).
21. See Coffee, Understandingthe Plaintiff'sAttorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum.
L. Rev. 669, 716 (1986).
A strike suit is litigation that is used to coerce defendants to settle. Shareholder plaintiffs bring such suits either to receive larger settlements than the corporate defendant
normally would agree to, or to receive settlements where the corporate defendant normally would not agree to one. See Note, supra note 16, at 324 n.94. Frivolous claims
form the basis of most strike suits. See 3 H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 15.29,
at 246 (2d ed. 1985). These unsubstantiated actions, however, rarely result in a settlement. See Class Action Study, prepared for the United States Senate Commerce Committee, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 62 Geo. L.J. 1123, 1136-37 (1974). In
fact, they can result in a substantial loss to the plaintiffs bringing the action. See 3 H.
Newberg, supra, at 247. Attorneys who bring such suits may be subject to Rule 11 sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Gieringer v. Silverman, 731 F.2d 1272, 1281 (7th Cir.
1984).
22. For this reason class actions are often referred to as "lawyer's lawsuits." See
Developments--ClassActions, supra note 19, at 1605. A "lawyer's lawsuit" occurs, for
example, in a suit for damages where there is absolutely no financial gain to the plaintiffs
upon victory. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 669 (1975) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
23. See supra note 21.
24. Rule 23 gives courts the power to deny class status when they find that the class
representatives would not protect the interests of the absent members. See supra notes 68 and accompanying text. Where the claims of representatives and absent members are
coextensive, the named plaintiff will vigorously prosecute the claims of the absent class in
order to be victorious on his own claim. Where no coextensive interests exist, courts will
deny certification because the named plaintiff will lack incentive to protect members'
interests. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1940); Machella v. Cardenas,
653 F.2d 923, 926-27 (5th Cir. 1981); Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 88 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980); Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 97 F.R.D. 683,
697-98 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
Rule 23 also requires court approval of any dismissal or compromise of a class action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e); see Umbriac v. American Snacks, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 265, 275 (E.D.
Pa. 1975) (judicial approval granted only when settlement benefits entire class).
Rule 23's protections seek to ensure that absent class members are not deprived unfairly of their individual claims. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807-
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adjudication and finality of suits brought against them.2 5
Normally, a judgment does not bind an individual who was not a party
to the case.2 6 Class actions represent an exception to this rule in that any
judgment usually binds absent members of the class.27 The Supreme
Court has held that when absent class members are inadequately represented, due process considerations prevent them from being bound by the
judgment.2" Absent class members, therefore, can collaterally attack a
judgment by asserting that representation was inadequate.2 9
A defendant also may object to the adequacy of class representation.
Based on his need to bind class members and to prevent future litigation,3 0 a defendant can object to the class's representation prior to certification.31 Practically, however, a defendant may very well object to the
adequacy of representation in order to prevent the lawsuit.32 If a court
denies certification, the case may be dropped, and the defendant would
not face liability. To achieve this outcome, a defendant often will attack
the adequacy of representation as tainted by a conflict of interests 33 when
08 (1985). When an absent class member's interests are not protected, he is not bound by
any judgment rendered, and his claim remains viable. Id. at 808.
25. See Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 808-810.
26. See Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 808; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40
(1940).
27. See PhillipsPetroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 808; Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42-43.
28. See Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 812; Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 45. If an
absent class member "actually participate[s] in the conduct of the litigation in which
members of the class are present as parties" or a specific relationship exists between the
absent member and the present parties, the judgment will bind him, even though adequate representation is lacking. Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 43.
29. The binding effect of a judgment in a class action suit can be determined only in a
subsequent action. See Kemp v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir.
1979). Plaintiffs can wait and attack any adverse judgment collaterally, arguing it is not
binding for want of adequate representation. See id. In the subsequent action, the court
must ask whether the trial court's determination of adequate representation initially was
accurate, and then whether, after the termination of the suit, adequate representation in
fact occurred. Id. If the court finds both prongs satisfied, the prior determination binds
the absent class member. See Malchman v. Davis, 588 F. Supp. 1047, 1058 (S.D.N.Y.
1984), modified, 761 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143 (1986). In
Malchman, 11 absent class members objected to a settlement approved by the court,
claiming that, because the named plaintiff was the brother of co-counsel, representation
was inadequate. Id. at 1052, 1057. The absent class members even objected because one
plaintiff was the sister of the chauffeur of a partner at a law firm representing plaintiffs.
Id. at 1057. The court found that no plaintiff had any interest in the attorneys' fees, id.,
and that the attorneys acted with "outstanding vigor and dedication", id. at 1058, and
held the representation to have been adequate.
30. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808-10 (1985); Hansberry v.
Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
31. See Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014, 1021-1023 (5th Cir. Unit
A Feb. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Umbriac v. American Snacks, Inc., 388
F. Supp. 265, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
32. See Clark v. Cameron-Brown Co., 72 F.R.D. 48, 55 (M.D.N.C. 1976); Umbriac
v. American Snacks, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 265, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1975); In re Goldchip Funding
Co., 61 F.R.D. 592, 594 (M.D. Pa. 1974); see also 1 H. Newberg, supra note 1, § 5.11, at
444.
33. See cases cited infra notes 34-36.
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an attorney seeks to serve as counsel for a class of which he,'
family member,3 5 or a legal associate, 3 6 is a member.
B.

a close

Potential Conflicts

Courts addressing the question of adequacy of representation in the

dual-capacity context generally have discussed three areas of conflict: at-

torney's fees, 37 the attorney as witness, 38 and the appearance of impropriety. 39 They have adopted two different approaches to determine if
disqualification is necessary. Some courts have adopted a per se rule,
automatically disqualifying a class counsel who is also a named plaintiff.4° Other courts have used a fact-specific approach and have disqualified the attorney only if certain conflicts actually arise.4 1 Because the
protections built into Rule 23 operate to identify conflicts in each area of
potential conflict, blanket rules are unwise and unnecessary.
1. Attorney's Fees

In a typical class action case, each class member's individual recovery

comprises a small percentage of the awarded damages.42 The size of the
entire recovery for the class affects the amount of attorney's fees received
by counsel for the class.4 3 Therefore, a dual-capacity attorney's expected
34. See, eg., Turoffv. May Co., 531 F.2d 1357, 1360 (6th Cir. 1976); Lowenschuss v.
Bluhdorn, 78 F.R.D. 675, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Graybeal v. American Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 13-14 (D.D.C. 1973).
35. See Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102, 103 (5th Cir. 1978) (one named
plaintiff married to partner in law firm representing the class); Susman v. Lincoln Am.
Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 95 (7th Cir. 1977) (counsel was brother of named plaintiff), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980); Stull v. Baker, 410 F. Supp. 1326, 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(named plaintiff is the uncle and law partner of class counsel); Fischer v. International
Tel. & Tel. Corp., 72 F.R.D. 170, 173 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (named plaintiff's son serving as
class counsel); Sweet v. Bermingham, 65 F.R-D. 551, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (plaintiff's
husband was partner in class counsel's law firm); Stull v. Pool, 63 F.R.D. 702, 704
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (wife of attorney as named plaintiff).
Courts also fear champerty when a close relationship exists. See, eg., Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 90-91 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980);
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 70 F.R.D. 608, 614 (D. Minn. 1976); Shields v. Valley Nat'l
Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448, 449-50 (D. Ariz. 1971).
36. See, eg., Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014, 1023 (5th Cir. Unit
A Feb. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534
F.2d 1085, 1087 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Umbriac v. American
Snacks, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 265, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc.,
56 F.R.D. 104, 105-06 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
37. See infra notes 42-79 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 80-101 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 102-119 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
42. See, eg., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 801 (1985) (average
claim $100, 28,100 class members, total possible recovery S2.8 million); Graybeal v.
American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 13-14 (D.D.C. 1973) (individual recoveries
small in comparison to total class recovery).
43. In class action suits for damages, the fee award increases proportionally with the
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attorney's fees may dwarf his possible recovery as a class member." This
creates a potential conflict both at the settlement stage and on final
judgment.
a.

Unfair Settlements

Courts sometimes adopt a per se rule of disqualification in response to
a concern that the dual-capacity attorney will settle a case unfairly in
order to receive his fees.4 5 When the named plaintiff also serves as the
class attorney, for which he may receive fees, he may feel less incentive to
question the fairness of a settlement on behalf of the class. 4 6 Because
named plaintiffs are liable for litigation costs, the attorney serving the
dual role actually can lose money if unsuccessful in reaching a favorable
verdict.47 Some courts argue that the mere possibility that the attorney
may act to further his own interests over those of the class presents a
conflict mandating disqualification."
Courts requiring disqualification because potential fee conflicts may induce disadvantageous settlements rely on a number of unwarranted presumptions. First, the courts that reason that an attorney will settle a

claim unfairly must assume that the attorney will breach his professional

and ethical duties, thereby subjecting himself to disciplinary action.4 9
Second, these courts seem to ignore the fact that the size of the fee may
class recovery. See 1 H. Newberg, supra note 1, § 3.40, at 251. When an attorney handles a case on a contingent basis, he expects to receive higher compensation in consideration for bearing the risk of not being compensated at all. See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973). If an
attorney's reasonable compensation, however, represents a large portion of the judgment,
then any "increased allowance for the contingent nature of the fee would be minimal."
Id.
44. See Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 91 (7th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied,
445 U.S. 942 (1980); Turoffv. May Co., 531 F.2d 1357, 1360 (6th Cir. 1976); Cotchett v.
Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
45. See Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1972) (small settlement
could produce a larger recovery to attorney than a larger settlement reached after more
work); Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674, 686 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (attorney
may settle to receive "immediate and certain compensation for himself in the form of
legal fees"), aff'd, 577 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Holland v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 75 F.R.D. 743, 748 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (attorney may settle on unfavorable
terms because "a large fee is part of the bargain" (quoting Graybeal v. American Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 13-14 (D.D.C. 1973))).
46. See generally cases cited supra note 45.
47. Although class members remain liable for expenses, often the attorney will only
receive reimbursement upon success. See Note, supra note 16, at 314-15. Thus, in cases
where the attorney forwards the expenses of litigation, he may choose to settle, realizing
that a loss in court would result in a major unreimbursed expense. Id.
48. See, e.g., Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1978);
Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1091 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
830 (1976); Turoffv. May Co., 531 F.2d 1357, 1360 (6th Cir. 1976); Graybeal v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 14 (D.D.C. 1973).
49. See I H. Newberg, supra note 1, § 3.40, at 251; see also, e.g., Model Code of
Professional Responsibility Canons 5 & 9 (1980) (attorney as witness and appearance of
impropriety).
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increase with the size of the settlement, 50 thus encouraging an attorney
concerned with the amount of his fee to prosecute the class claims vigorously.51 Third, even if a conflict actually arises, mandatory disqualification presumes that a court's supervision under Rule 23(e) is inadequate

to protect the absent members. 52 Examination of Rule 23(e) demon-

strates the fallacy of this last assumption.
Rule 23(e) provides that "[a] class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class

in such manner as the court directs."

3

The Supreme Court has held that

this Rule requires that courts afford notice to absent class members and

approve the proposed settlement.54 This gives absent class members two
distinct levels of protection: the court's supervision" and their own ability to attack any proposed settlements.56
Rule 23(e) requires courts to play an active role in settlement procedures and provides them with the machinery necessary to do so. It empowers the district courts to protect the class members from fee conflicts
by scrutinizing all proposed settlements.5 7 When reviewing settlements,
the courts consider, among other things, the likelihood of plaintiff's success on the merits, 58 the reaction of the class to the settlement, 59 and the
50. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
51. See 1 H. Newberg supra note 1, § 3.40, at 251; 7A C. Wright, A. Miller & M.
Kane, supra note 7, § 1769.1, at 385.
52. See Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 96 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 942 (1980). The Seventh Circuit's analysis in Susman illustrates some of the
flaws in basing disqualification on the risk of unfair settlement. First, the court found

that even if the dual-capacity attorney could effectively waive his fee, he would retain
pecuniary and non-pecuniary interests in any attorney's fees awarded to his firm. Id. at
94. The court held that this "would support a finding of a likelihood of a conflict of
interest." Id Then after noting that "'mere imaginative speculation' is not enough" to
warrant disqualification, id. at 94 n. 11 (quoting Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 899
(S.D.N.Y. 1975)), the court concluded that an "inherent conflict of interest" existed without referring to any factual basis for such a conflict. See Susman, 561 F.2d at 94 & n. 11.
Indeed, the court specifically stated that "we intend no adverse reflection whatsoever,
either professionally or personally, upon the individual counsel involved." Id. at 96. The
court's rationale also seems to contradict its earlier argument that the public perceives an
impropriety in dual-capacity representation by law firms. See id at 93.
53. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
54. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 724 n. 8, 725 (1986). For a general discussion of
the notice requirements, see 7B C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra note 4, § 1786, at
188-209.
55. See Fischer v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 72 F.R.D. 170, 173 (E.D.N.Y.
1976); Umbriac v. American Snacks, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 265, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
56. See 3 H. Newberg, supra note 21, § 16.29, at 358-59, 359 n.321.
57. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Courts scrutinize both the proposed

settlement and the suggested distribution when making their determination as to approval. See, eg., Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1148-49 (11th Cir.
1983) (settlement that favored the named plaintiffs rejected by court); Franks v. Kroger
Co., 649 F.2d 1216, 1226-27 (6th Cir. 1981) (overturning settlement favoring two named

plaintiffs and class attorney).
58. See Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424
(1968). A recent case from the Southern District of New York illustrates the kind of
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reasonableness of the amount offered in light of the best possible recovery
and the risks of litigation. 6'

Courts reviewing proposed settlements often simultaneously consider
the fees requested by the attorneys. 6 ' Courts may also bifurcate these
reviews, considering attorneys' fees and proposed settlements at separate
times. 62 Attorneys furnish affidavits detailing the specific work performed, the number of hours spent on each part of the preparation, and
the rate at which each hour was billed.63 This information provides an
adequate basis for the court to determine both the fairness of the settlement and the requested fees, making disqualification unnecessary. Thus,
disqualification of a dual-capacity attorney based on potential fee conflicts giving rise to unfavorable settlements is not justified. Rule 23
clearly provides an effective mechanism to prevent unfair settlements.
inquiry mandated by Rule 23(e). In Malchman v. Davis, 588 F. Supp. 1047, 1052-54
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), modified, 761 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143
(1986), the court, after a thorough analysis of the merits, approved a settlement waiving
damages. The court first discussed the importance of the settlement relief. See id. at
1052. The court then looked at the chief issues on the merits-liability and damages. See
id. at 1053-54. It found that the question of liability was difficult, and it would be impossible to predict the probable outcome. See id. The court then examined potential damage
recoveries and concluded that each plaintiff's damages would amount to under $100. See
id. The court also determined that if damages were to be litigated, subclasses would have
to be created and the litigation, therefore, would require great effort and expense. See id.
at 1054. Finally, the court noted that few members objected to the settlement and no
further litigation had been undertaken, indicating that even parties who had opted out of
the class were satisfied with the result. See id. at 1057. For another case considering the
difficulty of success on the merits, see Walsh v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 726 F.2d 956,
965-66 (3d Cir. 1983).
59. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1215 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); McNary v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 76
F.R.D. 644, 648 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
60. See, e.g., In re Traffic Executive Ass'n-Eastern R.R., 627 F.2d 631, 633 (2d Cir.
1980) (court rejected settlement that would result in class recovery of approximately
$600,000 where possible class recovery was between $32 million and $42 million); In re
South Cent. States Bakery Prods., 88 F.R.D. 641, 643 (M.D. La. 1980) (proposed settlement awarding class more than 33 1/3% of possible recovery approved in light of expense and possible duration of lawsuit).
61. Guidelines exist for judicial review of attorneys fees in general. See, e.g., City of
Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1977); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc.
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973). The
court first must multiply the number of hours worked by the hourly rate normally
charged by similar attorneys for like work. See Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d at 1098; Levit v.
Filmways, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 421, 423 (D. Del. 1985). The resulting number is called the
"lodestar" figure. See Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d at 1098; Levit, 620 F. Supp. at 423. The
court then must modify the lodestar by "the contingent nature of success and the quality
of the attorneys' work," resulting in the final fee amount. Levit, 620 F. Supp. at 423; see
also Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d at 1098; Malchman v. Davis, 588 F. Supp. 1047, 1059-60
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), modified, 761 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143
(1986). Courts follow these same steps when evaluating fees in class actions. See
Malchman, 588 F. Supp. at 1060.
62. See Levit, 620 F. Supp. at 421-22; Malchman, 588 F. Supp. at 1059; see also
Fischer v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 78 F.R.D. 237, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (court
approved settlement and then moved to issue of fees).
63. See, e.g., Levit, 620 F. Supp. at 424; Malchman, 588 F. Supp. at 1059.
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b.

Excessive Fees at Judgment

Potential fee conflicts manifest themselves at judgment as well. As discussed above, a dual-capacity class attorney may lack incentive to monitor fees. 6' With no client to control his actions, he may seek and receive
an excessive fee award at judgment.6" An award of exorbitant fees results in more money for the named plaintiff in his capacity as class counsel and less for other class members.6 6 Courts adopting a per se
disqualification rule hold that this opportunity to seek and receive an
excessive fee raises a conflict of interests and disqualify the dual-capacity
attorney.6 7
Some courts distinguish between cases in which class attorney's fees
will be paid out of a common fund, 68 and cases in which the fees will be
paid directly by the defendant. 69 When attorneys fees derive from a com64. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
65. See e.g., Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1972); Holland v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 75 F.R.D. 743, 748 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Graybeal v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 13-14 (D.D.C. 1973).
66. In common fund cases, see infra note 68, attorneys fees are deducted from a total
class recovery. See Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014, 1023-24 (5th Cir.
Unit A Feb. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982). Courts, therefore, are concerned
that the "class representative may be too generous with the class's money in granting a
fee." Id.at 1023. Attorneys fees are deducted in settlement cases as well. See In re
Traffic Exec. Ass'n-Eastern R.R., 627 F.2d 631, 633 (2d Cir. 1980).
67. See Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1978); Turoff v.
May Co., 531 F.2d 1357, 1360 (6th Cir. 1976); Holland v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
75 F.R.D. 743, 747-48 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
68. The common fund doctrine "provides that private plaintiff, or his attorney, whose
efforts create, discover, increase, or preserve a fund to which others also have a claim is
entitled to recover from the fund the costs of his litigation, including attorneys' fees."
Blacks Law Dictionary 250 (5th ed. 1979). The Supreme Court recognized this doctrine
in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975). In dualcapacity cases in which a common fund is created, some courts argue that the named
plaintiff may be overgenerous when awarding attorneys fees. See supra note 66. Even in
common fund cases, however, the court possesses supervisory powers to curb abuse. See
Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980).
69. Where the fees are paid directly by the defendant, the named plaintiff does not
have the opportunity to be overgenerous with the fees awarded. See Phillips v. Joint
Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014, 1024 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981), cerL denied, 456
U.S. 960 (1982); Spell v. McDaniel, 616 F. Supp. 1069, 1086 (F.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd in
part vacated in part, 824 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 1987); Brewster v. Dukakis, 544 F. Supp.
1069, 1070-71 (D. Mass. 1982), modified on other grounds, 786 F.2d 16 (Ist Cir. 1986).
Brewster illustrates how defendants' monitoring and court supervision operate as a
check on class counsel fees. 544 F. Supp. at 1071. Plaintiffs' attorney requested fees exceeding $1.2 million. Id. After calculating the basic fee award, to adjust the lodestar the
court considered the defendant's cooperation during the case, the fact that any fee would
come out of the public treasury, and that other fee applications were still pending. Id. at
1082. The fees actually awarded-$386,204.01-amounted to less than one-third of the
fees requested. Brewster, 544 F. Supp. at 1085.
When defendant does not oppose attorneys fees, the court must worry about collusion
between the plaintiffs' attorney and the defendant. See Malchman v. Davis, 588 F. Supp.
1047, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), modified, 761 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1143 (1986). For instance, a defendant may agree to a higher attorney fee in return for a
lower settlement. See id.
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mon fund, they reduce the fund before it is allocated to the class.7" If the
named plaintiff is also the attorney receiving the fees, he possesses no
incentive to object to excessive fees.7 1 When the defendant pays the attorneys fees directly, the dual-capacity attorney loses his opportunity to
approve an unreasonably large fee award because the defendant will challenge any unreasonable fees.7 2
Courts that disqualify the attorney when fees will derive from a common fund apparently believe that court supervision is inadequate to prevent unfair settlements.7 3 The Supreme Court has held that courts can
supervise common fund cases.74 Even if this supervision were insufficient,
disqualification would not represent the best solution. Instead of disqualifying the attorney, courts should disregard unreasonable fee requests
and should themselves calculate the appropriate fees.7 5 When the court
advises the parties to reach a settlement on the merits before discussing
fees, 76 the court eliminates its concern with an attorney's settlement procedures. 7 7 Even if practitioners fail to follow the court's advice and discuss fees before reaching a settlement, as the Supreme Court has noted is

often the case,78 the court's subsequent supervision sufficiently protects
the class.79

2.

The Attorney as Witness

Courts also base attorney disqualification on the possibility that the
dual-capacity attorney may be called as a witness.8 0 The attorney-as-

witness problem is not unique to class actions. Disqualification also may
occur in non-class action suits."' The rule that an attorney cannot act as
70. See supra notes 66 & 68.
71. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 69.
73. See, e.g., Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014, 1024 (5th Cir. Unit
A Feb. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534
F.2d 1085, 1090-91 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
74. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); Mills v. Electric AutoLite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 394-95 (1970).
75. See supra note 61.
76. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1353 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir.
1977).
77. The concern is that attorneys who negotiate fees simultaneously with negotiating
a class recovery are in a position of conflicting interests. See, e.g., Mendoza, 623 F.2d at
1352-53; Prandini,557 F.2d at 1021.
78. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 733-34 (1986); White v. New Hampshire Dep't
of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 453 n.15 (1982). The Supreme Court has held that
simultaneous negotiation is vital to promote settlements because a defendant will not
want to settle unless he knows what his total liability will be as a result of the settlement.
See Evans, 475 U.S. at 733-34; White, 455 U.S. at 453 n.15.
79. See Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1353 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 912 (1981).
80. See, e.g., Bachman v. Pertschuk, 437 F. Supp. 973, 976-77 (D.D.C. 1977); Kriger
v. European Health Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 104, 105-06 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
81. See, e.g., Groper v. Taft, 717 F.2d 1415, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1983); MacArthur v.
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both an advocate and as a witness on behalf of a client developed from
the rules of evidence. 2 Courts originally disqualified dual-capacity counsel on the ground that representation rendered him incompetent to testify
on the plaintiff's behalf."3 Although most modem courts reject this rationale,84 they nevertheless find that other conflicts exist when an attorney testifies in a case he is trying. 5 Such courts generally base
disqualification of the attorney on the breach of ethical standards.8 6
Courts rely on the American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the "Code") to set the guidelines for attorney conduct.87 Disciplinary Rule 5-101(B) mandates that an attorney not accept
employment in a litigation matter in which he "ought" to be called as a
witness.88 It has been argued that, because he might be called to testify, a
dual-capacity attorney is less adequate than others.8 9 The fact that a better class representative exists, however, does not render counsel inadequate. 90 Furthermore, courts that permit dual capacity have held that
Bank of New York, 524 F. Supp. 1205, 1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Comden v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal. 3d 906, 912, 576 P.2d 971, 973, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9, 11, cert. denied, 439 U.S.
981 (1978).
82. See 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1911 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976); Manual on Professional Responsibility [BNA Manual], Lawyer as Witness 61:501, 61:503 (1987).
83. See id.
84. See, e.g., Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym, 546 F.2d 530, 539 (3d
Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 984 (1977); Cottonwood Estates, Inc. v. Paradise Builders, Inc., 128 Ariz. 99, 102, 624 P.2d 296, 299 (1981).
85. See, e.g., Groper v. Taff, 717 F.2d 1415, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (advocate's testimony is impeachable due to his interest in the litigation); MacArthur v. Bank of New
York, 524 F. Supp. 1205, 1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (appearance of impropriety); Ford v.
State, 628 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982) (counsel may be subject to
impeachment).
86. See, e.g., Groper, 717 F.2d at 1418; MacArthur, 524 F. Supp. at 1208; Ford, 628
S.W.2d at 342.
87. See Ruder, Disqualificationof CounseL Disclosureof Client Confidences, Conflicts
of Interest, and PriorGovernment Service, 35 Bus. Law. 963, 964-65 (1980); Note, Ethics-Access of Substitute Counsel to a DisqualifiedAttorney's Work Product-FirstWisconsin Mortgage Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp., 15 Wake Forest L. Rev. 806, 810
(1979).
88. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-101(B) states "[a] lawyer shall
not accept employment ... if he knows or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm
ought to be called as a witness..
. ." Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5101(B) (1980) (emphasis added).
89. See Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 91 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Kriger
v. European Health Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 104, 105-06 (E.D. Wis. 1972)), cert denied, 445
U.S. 942 (1980).
90. A representative who is not as capable as other class members is not deemed
inadequate. See, e.g., Bowen v. General Motors Corp. A C Spark Plug Div., 542 F. Supp.
94, 102 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (citing Apanewicz v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.R.D. 672,
677 (E.D. Pa. 1978)), aff'd, 685 F.2d 160 (1982); Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am.,
Inc., 103 F.R.D. 562, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing Dura-Bilt Corp. v. Chase Manhattan
Corp., 89 F.R.D. 87, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)); see also Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508
F.2d 239, 247-48 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Piel v. National Semiconductor Corp., 86 F.R.D. 357, 366 (E.D. Pa. 1980); 7A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane,
supra note 7, § 1765, at 269. If the test was best representation, defendants would be able
to raise motions to deny certification based on inadequate representation by showing that
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the mere possibility that the attorney will be called as a witness does not

mandate disqualification. 9
At a minimum, when evaluating the attorney acting in a dual capacity,
courts should apply the same standards used for disqualifying an attorney who may be called as a witness in a non-class action case. The Code
requires disqualification of an attorney only when he "ought" to be called
as a witness on behalf of his client. 92 Courts have interpreted the word
"ought" to mean that the attorney's testimony is necessary to his client's
case.9 3 Thus, courts should require the disqualification of a dual-capacity attorney only if his testimony relates to material facts, 94 or facts that
could not be elicited from other witnesses. 95 Absent defendant's proof
that the testimony concerns material or otherwise unavailable facts, the
representation is adequate and disqualification is unnecessary.

Disciplinary Rule 5-101(B) also provides four exceptions to the attorney-as-witness disqualification rule that permit the attorney to testify
about matters described in the exceptions.9 6 A per se rule of disqualification based on the possibility that the class attorney will be called as a
any other class member would be a better representative than the party seeking to represent the class. The rule, however, only requires "adequate" representation. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
91. See, e.g., Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 91 (7th Cir. 1977) (implying
that attorney may be able to proceed without testifying), cert denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980);
Clark v. Cameron-Brown Co., 72 F.R.D. 48, 56 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (attorney would have
to be disqualified only if his testimony were needed).
92. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
93. The term "ought" has been held to mean testimony that would be of substantial
help to the client. See MacArthur v. Bank of New York, 524 F. Supp. 1205, 1208-11
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). Another interpretation has left discretion to the attorney and his client.
See Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 789-90, 393 N.E.2d 847, 857 (1979). In Comden
v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 906, 576 P.2d 971, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9, cert. denied, 439 U.S.
981 (1978), the court held that a number of factors, including the materiality of matters
to which the testimony relates, the testimony's probative value, and the availability of
other means of proof, had to be considered. See id. at 913, 576 P.2d at 974, 145 Cal.
Rptr. at 12.
94. See United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 1439-40 (10th Cir. 1987); Clark v.
Cameron-Brown Co., 72 F.R.D. 48, 56 (M.D.N.C. 1976); Comden v. Superior Court, 20
Cal. 3d 906, 913, 576 P.2d 971, 974, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9, 12, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981
(1978).
95. This is consistent with the analysis requiring disqualification only when testimony
is needed. See supra note 93. A class action attorney occupies a unique position. A
prerequisite to class action cases is numerosity. See supra note 6. In most cases, therefore, it would appear that any testimony the attorney might provide could be elicited
from other named or unnamed plaintiffs. In cases where other plaintiffs could testify
concerning the same matters, the attorney would not have to be disqualified. See Clark,
72 F.R.D. at 56. In addition, in these instances the attorney's testimony would be cumulative and therefore immaterial, so the attorney could testify. Cf. United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 1439-41 (10th Cir. 1987).
96. DR 5-101(B) prohibits a lawyer from testifying in cases in which he or his firm is
counsel,
except that

. . .

he or a lawyer in his firm may testify:

(1) If the testimony will relate solely to an uncontested matter.
(2) If the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is no
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witness therefore denies what even the disciplinary rules may permit."'

Moreover, in non-class suits, courts have denied disqualification when
a defendant uses Disciplinary Rule 5-102(A)9" as a dilatory tactic. 9
Courts refuse to allow defendants to take strategic advantage of the Disciplinary Rules when their argument lacks merit."° Likewise, courts
should deny motions for disqualification in class actions where the defendant is merely attempting to stall or prevent class action litigation.,',
3. Appearance of Impropriety: Canon 9
Some courts hold that the appearance of impropriety stemming from
dual-capacity representation also requires disqualification. 02 The title of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "A Lawreason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the
testimony.
(3) If the testimony will relate solely to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case by the lawyer or his firm to the client.
(4) As to any matter, if refusal would work a substantial hardship on the
client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the
particular case.
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-101(B) (1980).
97. For example, in Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 104 (E.D. Wis.
1972), the court held that the "plaintiff has commenced an action under a disability that
no other member of the class is likely to have-an inability to testify except at the cost of
withdrawal of counsel." Id. at 106. The court does not discuss the subject to which the
attorney's testimony would relate. DR 5-101(B) permits counsel to testify to matters
included under the exceptions. See supra note 96. Adopting a per se rule disqualifying
the attorney every time he might be called as a witness, as did the court in Kriger, would
preclude attorneys from ever testifying. It would also always prevent named plaintiffs
from acting as counsel to the class. Even the disciplinary rule that provides a basis for
the courts' arguments allows some testimony. See Bachman v. Pertschuk, 437 F. Supp.
973, 976-77 (D.D.C. 1977); see also supra note 96 and accompanying text.
98. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-102(A) (1980). This disciplinary rule enumerates the same exceptions to withdrawal from representation when counsel must testify as DR 5-101(B) does. See supra note 96.
99. See Council for the Nat'l Register of Health Serv. Providers v. American Home
Assurance Co., [1 Current Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 1083,
1084 (Dec. 11, 1985) (D.D.C. Civil Action No. 85-2626) (opinion dated Nov. 15, 1985); S
& S Hotel Ventures L.P. v. 777 S.H. Corp., 69 N.Y.2d 437, 445, 515 N.Y.S.2d 735, 738,
508 N.E.2d 647, 650 (1987).
100. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 22, 28 (3d Cir. 1980); American
Home Assurance Co., [1 Current Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) at
1084.
101. See Umbriac v. American Snacks, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 265, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Clark v. Cameron-Brown Co., 72 F.R.D. 48, 55 (M.D.N.C. 1976). When defendants
make motions objecting to the adequacy of representation by asserting that the prerequisites in Rule 23 are not satisfied, he hopes to prevent class certification. See supra note 6.
If class status is denied, the individual claims may be too small to justify separate litigation. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. Raising opposition which results in a
denial of class status may prevent the defendant from ever having to face trial.
102. See, e.g., Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1978);
Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1091-92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 830 (1976).
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yer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety.""10 3
This canon seeks to prevent attorneys from acting in ways that appear
unethical to laymen.'0 4 Attorney conduct that appears unethical could
undermine public confidence in the legal profession and the judicial system. 10 5 These courts acknowledge that situations exist where the appearance of impropriety attaches to
an attorney who attempts to serve in a
10 6
dual capacity in class actions.
Some courts have found that attorneys attempting to serve in a dual
capacity in class actions involving equitable funds must be disqualified
under Canon 9.107 These courts argue that even if no actual fee conflict
exists, the potential attorney fee conflict presents an appearance of impropriety.'0 s In Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp.,109 for example, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted a limited per se rule
under Canon 9, disqualifying class counsel in equitable fund cases. The
court held that "it is the appearance, not the fact, of impropriety which
Canon 9 is designed to eliminate."" 0 The Fifth Circuit, although originally adopting a per se disqualification rule under Canon 9, now has restricted the rule's use to equitable fund cases."' In such cases, once
these courts find the appearance of impropriety, they hold that Canon 9
mandates disqualification of the attorney attempting to serve in a dual
capacity, as well as his partners, attorney-employees, and office
associates.112
Other courts, permitting dual-capacity representation have held, however, that an appearance of impropriety does not always require disqualification." 3 These courts make a distinction between common fund and
non-common fund cases, and are concerned with the appearance of im103. Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 9 (1980).
104. EC 9-2 provides that "[o]n occasion, ethical conduct of a lawyer may appear to
laymen to be unethical." Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 9-2 (1980); see
Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1091 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
105. EC 9-2 states "[A] lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal system and the
legal profession." Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 9-2 (1980). "It does
not follow, however, that an attorney's conduct must be governed by standards which
can be imputed only to the most cynical members of the public." Woods, 537 F.2d at
813.
106. See Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1978); Kramer,
534 F.2d at 1091-92.
107. See Phillips, 637 F.2d at 1023; Kramer,534 F.2d at 1092.
108. See supra note 107.
109. 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
110. Id. at 1091.
111. See Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014, 1023 (5th Cir. Unit A
Feb. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
112. See Kramer, 534 F.2d at 1092.
113. See, e.g., Phillips, 637 F.2d at 1023; Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d
804, 813 n.12 (5th Cir. 1976).
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propriety arising from attorneys' settlement procedures." 4 Once a common fund settlement is negotiated by the parties and approved by the
court, dual-capacity representation provides no check on the attorneys
fees, creating an appearance of impropriety." 5 Some courts use the appearance of impropriety argument to bolster their reasons for disqualifying the attorney." 6
Canon 9, however, does not require disqualification in every case in
which the court finds a reasonable possibility of improper conduct." 7
The "court must also find that the likelihood of public suspicion or obloquy outweighs the social interests which will be served by a lawyer's conFurthermore, it has been
tinued participation in a particular case.""'
held that courts should not resort to Canon 9 as a basis for disqualification when no other ethical or disciplinary rule would justify the attorney's removal. 1 9 Thus, courts should disqualify an attorney only when
real misconduct, or a serious risk of the appearance of it, exists, and not
base disqualification on the mere appearance of impropriety.
CONCLUSION

When defendants object to the adequacy of representation, their primary motive often is to have certification denied to delay or actually prevent a legitimate class action lawsuit. Attacks on dual-capacity
representation often have resulted in the adoption of a per se rule of
disqualification.
Most often disqualification is based on one of three areas of potential
conflict: attorney's fees, attorneys as witnesses, or the appearance of impropriety. First, court supervision is adequate to protect against any attorney's fee conflict, so the use of such a potential conflict as a ground for
disqualification is unwarranted. Second, mandating disqualification
whenever an attorney may have to appear as a witness also is inappropriate since it would prohibit some conduct permitted by the Disciplinary
Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Third, the appearance
114. See Phillips, 637 F.2d at 1023; Kramer, 534 F.2d at 1091-92; see also supra notes
76, 77 & accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 46, 64, 71 & accompanying text.
116. In Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d 1020 (5th
Cir. Unit B June), cert denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reviewed the district court's decision to grant defendant's motion to disqualify
plaintiff's counsel. See id. at 1021. The district court noted that it recognized that even
the appearance of impropriety is prohibited by Canon 9. Id at 1032. On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit stated "[tlhis statement provides us with no basis for determining whether
or for what reason the court felt... [the] representation... was prohibited by Canon 9."
Id.
117. See Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 n.12 (5th Cir. 1976);
supra note 113.
118. Id.
119. See United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 1442 (10th Cir. 1987); International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1295 (2d Cir. 1975).
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of impropriety is not always a sufficient reason to deprive a class of its
counsel. The interests of the public and the class must be balanced.
Because absent members can protect their interests by objecting to certification of the class it is not necessary to allow defendants to attack
adversary counsel arbitrarily. Such a practice can result in the disqualification of the best possible counsel, and the retention of the worst. Such a
practice also encourages defendants to oppose the adequacy of representation in an attempt to escape liability. The adoption of per se rules of
disqualification not only denies justice to plaintiffs, but also controverts
the purpose of Rule 23. Because attorney disqualification should be the
exception, not the rule, courts should use a fact-specific approach and
disqualify attorneys only when actual conflicts arise. A fact-specific approach furthers the goals of the class action device and gives plaintiffs
their day in court.
Neil L. Rock

